While South Island Resource Recovery Ltd (SIRRL) lodged an application on 1 May 2024 to have its Project Kea waste-to-energy proposal included in the Government’s Fast-track legislation, it was not the only waste incinerator project seeking a place on the list.
Global Contracting Solutions Ltd (GCSL) also lodged an application for its proposed Paewira waste-to-energy project at Te Awamutu. The two proposals were not identical, but they had obvious similarities in their technology, scale and likely effects. More importantly for what followed, they travelled essentially the same path through the Fast-track selection process.
Both went through the Ministry for the Environment’s initial process to determine whether their applications were complete. Both then went before the Government’s independent Fast-track Projects Advisory Group. And both were recommended for inclusion as Schedule 2 projects.
At that point, there was remarkably little separating the status of the two proposals. Whatever differences existed between the projects themselves, neither had been rejected by the independent assessment process. Both had made it through the Ministry’s completeness check, both had been assessed by the Advisory Group and both had emerged with a recommendation for inclusion.
Then something changed.
When the Government announced its final list, Project Kea was there. GCSL was not.
That raises some obvious questions. If both proposals had reached essentially the same point in the process, who decided that SIRRL should proceed while GCSL should not? What distinguished one from the other at that final stage? And what advice or information was used to make that decision?
Why Waste Waimate has spent the past few months trying to answer those seemingly simple questions. It has proved considerably more difficult than it should have been.
A perplexing answer
Our first questions went to then Environment Minister Penny Simmonds. We asked a fairly straightforward question: given the similar technology, scale and likely effects of the two proposals, why had SIRRL’s project been included in Fast-track while GCSL’s had not?
The answer we received was surprising. Simmonds told us GCSL had not lodged a Fast-track application.
That was rather perplexing, given that her own Ministry had assessed GCSL’s Fast-track application for completeness as part of the process. The Minister’s response had to be challenged and corrected, but correcting that answer still did not tell us why the two projects had received different outcomes.
Our attention therefore turned to the Minister responsible for RMA Reform, Chris Bishop.
What followed has been months of OIA requests and correspondence attempting to pin down answers to essentially the same questions we started with. Why was Project Kea included when GCSL was not? Who made that decision? And what advice or information was available to the person who made it?
These should not be particularly difficult questions to answer. They have nevertheless proved remarkably difficult to get clear answers to.
After the Advisory Group
One thing has become much clearer through the process. The independent Advisory Group did not make the decision that separated SIRRL from GCSL. It couldn’t have, because it recommended both.
Bishop subsequently clarified through the OIA process that officials did not make the final project-selection decisions either. Those decisions were made by Ministers through the Government’s subsequent decision-making process.
That is significant because it identifies the point at which the paths of the two projects diverged. Referring us back to the Advisory Group cannot explain why Project Kea was ultimately selected while another waste-to-energy proposal recommended by the same group was not. Whatever caused the different outcomes happened after the Advisory Group had finished its work.
The Government’s own published Cabinet material gives us a much better idea of who was responsible for that next stage. Responsibility for project selection had been delegated between three Ministers according to the sectors the projects fell within. Chris Bishop was responsible for Housing/Land Development and Infrastructure, excluding transport and energy. Simeon Brown was responsible for Transport and Energy, while Shane Jones was responsible for Mining, Quarrying, Aquaculture and Farming.
Project Kea was listed under Housing/Land Development.
On the information currently available, that places Project Kea within Bishop’s delegated responsibility.
We have been careful about this point. We do not have a document saying, in those exact words, “Chris Bishop decided to include Project Kea.” But Bishop has now been provided with several opportunities to tell us if somebody else made that decision. He hasn’t. Instead, the available Cabinet material identifies Bishop as the Minister responsible for the category under which Project Kea was selected.
That brings us back to the harder question: why?
What changed?
At the end of the Advisory Group process, both SIRRL and GCSL had been recommended. At the end of the Ministerial selection process, SIRRL was in and GCSL was out. Something therefore happened between those two points.
The published Cabinet material tells us that Ministers had more information available to them than simply the Advisory Group’s recommendations. It refers to further cross-agency or supplementary advice from officials and says that, where Ministers diverged from the Advisory Group’s recommendations, supplementary advice assessing projects against Government priorities informed those decisions.
That would appear to be exactly the sort of information capable of explaining what happened to SIRRL and GCSL. Officials may have identified some significant advantage in Project Kea, or a problem with GCSL. The projects may have performed differently when considered against wider Government priorities. Ministers may have received other information that was not decisive during the Advisory Group process. Or a Minister may simply have exercised discretion and chosen one over the other.
The problem is that, after months of asking, we still don’t know.
Over a series of OIA requests and follow-up correspondence, Bishop has been given repeated opportunities to provide the missing information or explain where it can be found. We have sought the identity of the decision-maker, the authority under which the decision was made, assessments, recommendations, advice, briefings and information explaining the different treatment of SIRRL and GCSL.
Eventually Bishop’s office gave what appears to be its final position:
“No further information in scope of your request is held by either my office or the Ministry for the Environment.”
We were also told:
“Further requests seeking the same or substantially similar information are unlikely to result in any additional information being released.”
That presents something of a problem. If Bishop is correct, and there really is no further information beyond what has already been released or made publicly available, then where is the record explaining the decision?
The public material tells us the Advisory Group recommended both projects, that Ministers subsequently made selections, that responsibility was delegated between Ministers, that Project Kea fell within Bishop’s delegated sector and that Ministers had supplementary officials’ advice available to them.
What it does not appear to tell us is why SIRRL was selected and GCSL wasn’t.
Looking beyond Bishop
Because repeated requests to Bishop had failed to uncover that missing part of the process, we went to the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet.
The request was deliberately narrow. We sought the underlying Cabinet Office and DPMC records establishing the authority and framework under which Ministers made their selections after receiving the Advisory Group recommendations.
DPMC split the request. It retained the Cabinet Office component but transferred the questions relating to Ministerial authority and discretion back to Bishop, saying those matters were more closely connected with his responsibilities as Minister Responsible for RMA Reform.
DPMC then searched for the underlying Cabinet Office records and told us:
“Searches by my office for any documents relevant to your request have returned no relevant information.”
The request was refused under section 18(e) of the Official Information Act on the basis that the documents did not exist.
So, once again, we ended up back with Bishop.
On 19 August Bishop responded to the transferred portion of the DPMC request. Importantly, his response acknowledged that what we were seeking was the underlying material, rather than another copy of information already publicly available.
Nevertheless, the answer was much the same:
“this office does not hold any additional information within the scope of the transferred parts of your request that is not already publicly available.”
We were again directed to the Advisory Group report, published Ministerial decisions, Beehive material and the published Cabinet paper.
But those documents don’t answer the question. In many respects, they are the documents that create it.
Why Project Kea?
After months of correspondence, we may now be much closer to establishing who was responsible for the decision, but we are no closer to establishing why it was made.
If the published Cabinet material is followed, Project Kea fell within Bishop’s delegated area of responsibility. If Bishop wasn’t responsible for its selection, he has had ample opportunity to tell us who was. Yet if we are also to accept Bishop’s position that there is no further relevant information beyond material already publicly available, we are left with a remarkable gap in the documentary record.
Two broadly comparable waste-to-energy proposals went through the same process. Both passed the Ministry’s initial completeness stage and both went before the same independent Advisory Group. Both were recommended for inclusion. Ministers then undertook a further selection process, after which one project was included and the other was not.
There may be a perfectly reasonable explanation for choosing Project Kea over GCSL. Perhaps Project Kea was considered substantially better. Perhaps GCSL was considered substantially worse. Perhaps some wider Government priority favoured one over the other. Perhaps Ministers decided New Zealand only needed one waste incinerator on the Fast-track list.
But if any of those explanations are correct, where is the advice or assessment that says so?
At this point we might as well speculate that somebody drew tarot cards to decide which project went forward. But that is precisely the point: we shouldn’t have to speculate.
This was a Government decision to give one major waste incinerator proposal access to an extraordinary Fast-track consenting pathway while denying that opportunity to another proposal which had emerged from the independent assessment process with the same recommendation.
There should be a documentary trail capable of explaining how that decision was reached.
After months of OIA requests, we are left with a much clearer picture of the process, and a strong indication of who was responsible for Project Kea’s sector. What remains missing is the most important part of the story.
Why was Project Kea chosen?

